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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Martin Deutch appeals from the District Court's 
judgment and orders approving the settlement of a 
securities fraud class action brought against Cendant 
Corporation, 28 individual defendants, and Ernst & Young, 
an accounting firm. Under the settlement, Cendant agreed 
to pay $2.85 billion in cash to the class and Ernst & Young 
 
agreed to pay $335 million to the class. In addition, 
Cendant and certain of the individual defendants promised 
to pay the class 50% of any recovery obtained in their 
cross-claims against Ernst & Young. In exchange, the class 
agreed to release any and all claims that could have been 
brought against the defendants in the class action. 
 
A number of class members objected to the settlement. 
Deutch, who was not a member of the class but rather a 
current shareholder of Cendant, also objected and moved to 
intervene as both a current shareholder and as a derivative 
action plaintiff. In two separate opinions filed on August 15, 
2000, the District Court rejected the objections of the class 
members and Deutch respectively and approved the 
settlement. 
 
The approvals generated a flurry of appeals. The appeals 
of the class members are being disposed of in a separate 
opinion, holding, inter alia, that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in rejecting the class members' 
objections to the settlement and plan of allocation. See In 
re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., Nos. 00-2520, 00-2683, 00- 
 
2708, 00-2709, 00-2733, 00-2734, 00-2769 and 00-3653 
(3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2001). In this opinion, we turn to Deutch's 
appeal, which presents distinct issues of law relating to a 
current shareholder seeking to present claims on behalf of 
the settling corporation. 
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I. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
 
Many of the facts set forth in the following section of this 
opinion will also be set forth and discussed in greater 
length in the principal opinion dealing with the appeals of 
the objecting class members. The abbreviated facts 
included here are those necessary to put Deutch's 
contentions in context. 
 
A. Discovery of the Misconduct 
 
On December 17, 1997, CUC International, Inc. ("CUC") 
merged with HFS Inc. ("HFS"). As part of the merger, 
shareholders of HFS stock were issued shares of CUC 
common stock pursuant to a Registration Statement dated 
August 28, 1997 and a Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus. 
The surviving corporation was renamed Cendant Corp. 
("Cendant"). Cendant is now one of the world's foremost 
consumer and business service companies, providing 
shopping, dining, travel, mortgage, and real estate 
brokerage services. It owns, among other things, Century 
21, Avis, and the Ramada and Howard Johnson hotel 
franchises. 
 
On March 31, 1998, Cendant filed a Form 10-K Annual 
Report with the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC"), 
which included its 1997 financial statements. On April 15, 
1998, Cendant announced that it had discovered 
accounting irregularities in certain former CUC business 
units and that the annual and quarterly financial 
statements for 1997 would be restated. Cendant also 
suggested that financial statements from earlier periods 
might need to be corrected as well. The next day, Cendant's 
stock fell from $35 5/8 a share to $19 1/16 a share - a 
47% drop. The Audit Committee of Cendant's Board of 
Directors hired the law firm of Willkie Farr & Gallagher to 
conduct an independent investigation into the irregularities, 
and the law firm in turn hired the accounting firm of 
Arthur Andersen LLP to assist in the investigation. On July 
14, 1998, Cendant announced that CUC's financial 
statements for 1995 and 1996 would also be restated. 
Following this announcement, Cendant's stock dropped to 
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$15 11/16. On August 28, 1998, Cendant filed with the 
SEC a report prepared by Willkie Farr which disclosed, 
among other things, that the 1995, 1996, and 1997 
financial statements materially misstated revenue and 
income. Cendant's stock further dropped to $11 5/8 on the 
next trading day. 
 
B. The Securities Fraud Class Action 
 
Numerous plaintiffs claiming to have acquired CUC or 
Cendant securities filed lawsuits against Cendant and 
others alleging, inter alia, federal securities law violations. 
By an order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
the suits were transferred to the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey and then consolidated. 
The District Court appointed the California Public 
Employees' Retirement System, the New York State 
Common Retirement Fund, and the New York City Pension 
Funds as Lead Plaintiff.1 See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 182 
F.R.D. 144 (D.N.J. 1998). The District Court later approved 
the law firms of Barrack, Rodos & Bacine and Bernstein 
Litowitz Berger & Grossman LLP to be Lead Counsel for the 
class. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 191 F.R.D. 387 (D.N.J. 
1998). 
 
C. The Amended and Consolidated Class Action 
       Complaint 
 
On December 14, 1998, the Lead Plaintiff filed an 
amended and consolidated class action complaint 
("Amended Complaint") on behalf of all persons and entities 
who purchased or acquired Cendant or CUC publicly- 
traded securities, excluding the PRIDES securities, 2 during 
the period of May 31, 1995 through August 28, 1998 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We refer to Lead Plaintiff in the singular for the reasons explained at 
In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., Nos. 00-2520 et al., Opinion at 19 n.3. 
 
2. The term "PRIDES securities" refers to a derivative security based on 
Cendant common stock. The District Court separated all claims brought 
by holders and former holders of the PRIDES securities and appointed a 
different lead plaintiff and counsel. The PRIDES claims were settled on 
March 17, 1999 for $341.5 million in Cendant securities and the District 
Court approved the PRIDES settlement. See In re Cendant Corp. PRIDES 
Litig., 51 F. Supp. 2d 537 (D.N.J. 1999), vacated in part by 243 F.3d 722 
(3d Cir. 2001) (vacating attorneys' fees award). 
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("Class Period"). The Amended Complaint named as 
defendants Cendant, 12 individuals who were former 
officers and/or directors of CUC (the "CUC Individual 
Defendants"),3 16 individuals who were former officers 
and/or directors of HFS (the "HFS Individual Defendants"),4 
and Ernst & Young ("E&Y"), which had been CUC's 
independent public accountant before the merger. 
 
The Amended Complaint alleged that Cendant (as 
successor to CUC), E&Y, and certain of the CUC and HFS 
Individual Defendants made numerous false and misleading 
statements during the Class Period, in violation of Section 
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 
S 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. S 240.10b-5. 
Specifically, a number of SEC filings and press releases 
issued by CUC allegedly overstated its revenues and 
operating income for 1995, 1996, and 1997 through 
improper accounting practices, which allegedly violated 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and were 
concealed by the defendants. 
 
The Amended Complaint alleged that all of the 
defendants except Anne Pember and Scott Forbes caused 
the August 28, 1997 Registration Statement issued in 
conjunction with the CUC/HFS merger to contain false and 
misleading statements, in violation of Section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. S 77k. The Amended 
Complaint next alleged that Cendant violated Section 
12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77l(a)(2), by 
selling securities through a false and misleading 
prospectus. The Amended Complaint further alleged 
violations by certain of the individual defendants of Section 
15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. S77o, Section 20(a) of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The CUC Individual Defendants are Walter A. Forbes, E. Kirk Shelton, 
Christopher K. McLeod, Cosmo Corigliano, Anne M. Pember, Burton C. 
Perfit, T. Barnes Donnelley, Stephen A. Greyser, Kenneth A. Williams, 
Barlett Burnap, Robert P. Rittereiser, and Stanley M. Rumbough, Jr. 
 
4. The HFS Individual Defendants are Henry R. Silverman, John D. 
Snodgrass, Michael P. Monaco, James E. Buckman, Scott E. Forbes, 
Steven P. Holmes, Robert D. Kunisch, Leonard S. Coleman, Christel 
DeHaan, Martin L. Edelman, Brian Mulroney, Robert E. Nederlander, 
Robert W. Pittman, E. John Rosenwald, Jr., Leonard Schutzman, and 
Robert F. Smith. 
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the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. S 78t(a), Section 20A 
of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. S 78t-1, and 
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
S 78n(a), and Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-9. 
 
D. Class Certification, Notice, and Settlement 
       Negotiations 
 
Concurrent with the filing of the Amended Complaint, 
Lead Plaintiff filed a motion to certify the class pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3), which the District Court 
granted on January 27, 1999. Lead Counsel began 
settlement discussions with Cendant and the HFS 
Individual Defendants in June 1999, and Lead Counsel 
began settlement discussions with E&Y in the subsequent 
months. 
 
On December 7, 1999, several months after notice to the 
class of the pendency of the class action, Cendant, the HFS 
Individual Defendants, and the Lead Plaintiff advised the 
District Court that they had agreed to a settlement. Shortly 
thereafter, E&Y and the Lead Plaintiff informed the court 
that they too had settled. On March 17, 2000, the settling 
parties executed a Stipulation of the Settlement. 
 
E. Terms of the Settlement and Plan of Allocation 
 
The settlement with Cendant and the HFS Individual 
Defendants provides for a payment by Cendant to the class 
of $2,851,500,000 in cash, provides for an additional 
payment of 50% of any recovery by Cendant and the HFS 
Individual Defendants in their cross-claims against E&Y, 
and imposes certain corporate governance changes on 
Cendant. These changes include constituting Cendant's 
Board of Directors with a majority of independent directors, 
constituting the Audit, Nominating, and Compensation 
Committees of the Board entirely with independent 
directors, and providing for the annual election of all 
directors. In exchange, the class members would release all 
claims that were filed or could have been filed in the action 
against Cendant, the HFS Individual Defendants, and the 
CUC Individual Defendants. 
 
As part of the Stipulation of Settlement, Cendant, the 
HFS Individual Defendants, and the Lead Plaintiff agreed to 
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request the District Court to approve the settlement as fair, 
reasonable, and adequate. In addition, these parties asked 
the court to permanently bar all claims for contribution 
pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
(hereafter "Reform Act"), specifically the provision codified 
at 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(f)(7)(A), and as may be provided by 
applicable federal and state statutes or common law. 
However, the parties also asked the court to declare that 
the settlement was not a waiver or release of any claims 
that could be brought by Cendant against E&Y or any 
current or former officer or director of CUC, HFS, or 
Cendant. 
 
The E&Y settlement provides for a cash payment of 
$335,000,000 to the class. In conjunction with the Cendant 
and E&Y settlement, the Lead Plaintiff proposed a Plan of 
Allocation covering what each class member would receive 
from the settlement. Neither the E&Y settlement nor the 
Plan of Allocation is at issue in Deutch's appeal. 
 
F. Settlement Notice, Objections, and Approval 
 
The District Court granted preliminary approval of both 
settlements on March 29, 2000, and Lead Plaintiff 
proceeded with the required notices of settlement of class 
actions, mailing over 478,000 to class members and 
publishing notices in national newspapers and media. Only 
four class members objected to the settlements and/or the 
Plan of Allocation. 
 
Martin Deutch, who was not a member of the class but 
rather a current shareholder of Cendant, also objected and 
moved to intervene as a current shareholder and 
a derivative action plaintiff.5 Deutch objected on the 
following grounds: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Deutch had earlier commenced a derivative action in the District 
Court on behalf of Cendant against several of the CUC and HFS 
Individual Defendants who were officers and/or directors of Cendant. 
Deutch alleged that the individual defendants breached their fiduciary 
duty of loyalty because, acting on insider information, they sold over 
four 
million shares of Cendant stock at artificially inflated prices in order 
to 
realize over $180 million for their personal gain, and that they breached 
their fiduciary duties of loyalty, good faith, and due care in mismanaging 
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       (1) Cendant was not adequately represented in the 
       class action because 13 of the 14 members of 
       Cendant's board of directors that negotiated and 
       approved the settlement were also defendants in the 
       class action and therefore operated under a conflict of 
       interest; 
 
       (2) The settlement was grossly unfair to Cendant and 
       its current shareholders because it eliminated valuable 
       contribution claims against the individual defendants 
       without any meaningful payment into the settlement by 
       these defendants; 
 
       (3) The settlement failed to allocate the portion of 
       Cendant's $2.85 billion settlement that was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
and wasting corporate assets. Deutch also alleged that Bear Stearns 
Companies, Inc. and its subsidiary, Bear Stearns and Co., Inc., were 
grossly negligent in advising HFS on the Cendant merger. 
 
Several defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. On August 9, 
1999, the District Court held that Deutch need not have made a demand 
to Cendant's board of directors to bring that action because any such 
demand would have been futile. However, the court dismissed the claims 
against the Bear Stearns defendants on the basis that Deutch lacked 
standing to sue on behalf of HFS. See In re Cendant Corp. Derivative 
Action Litig., 189 F.R.D. 117 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 
After the Cendant settlement was announced, Deutch moved for 
partial summary judgment against the individual defendants, arguing 
that these defendants violated Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 
U.S.C. S 77k(f), and were liable to Cendant for contribution under 
Section 11(f) for monies to be paid out in the settlement. On April 14, 
2000, the District Court denied summary judgment, holding that 
Deutch's motion for summary judgment was not ripe for consideration 
because any right to contribution is inchoate until after settlement has 
been approved and Cendant has paid more than its fair share of the 
settlement. See In re Cendant Corp. Derivative Action Litig., 96 F. Supp. 
2d 394, 397 (D.N.J. 2000). The court also noted that Deutch's derivative 
action complaint did not include any allegations pertaining to Cendant's 
decision to settle or the structure of the settlement. See id. at 399. The 
court later imposed Rule 11 sanctions on Deutch's attorney for 
improperly moving for summary judgment. See In re Cendant Corp. 
Derivative Action Litig., 96 F. Supp. 2d 403 (D.N.J. 2000). That action 
remains pending. 
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       attributable to Section 11 claims, which was critical for 
       determining the value of the contribution claims that 
       will remain if the settlement is approved; 
 
       (4) The settlement constituted an illegal indemnification 
       of individual officers and directors of Cendant, CUC, 
       and HFS; 
 
       (5) The Notice of Settlement was defective because it 
       did not inform current Cendant shareholders that 
       certain derivative claims would be compromised and 
       that contribution claims by Cendant against the HFS 
       defendants would be barred. 
 
On June 28, 2000, the District Court conducted a 
fairness hearing at which the objectors were given an 
opportunity to be heard. On August 15, 2000, the District 
Court issued two opinions rejecting the objections and 
approving the Cendant and E&Y settlements and the Plan 
of Allocation. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. 
Supp. 2d 235 (D.N.J. 2000) (rejecting the class members' 
objections); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d 
273 (D.N.J. 2000) (rejecting Deutch's objections). 
 
In the corresponding judgment approving the Cendant 
settlement, the court ordered that "[a]ll actions and claims 
for contribution are permanently barred, enjoined and 
finally discharged (i) as provided by 15 U.S.C.S 78u- 
4(f)(7)(A), and (ii) as may be provided by applicable federal 
or state statutes or common law." App. at 16. Moreover, the 
court noted that "this Judgment shall not be deemed a 
waiver or release of and shall not preclude Cendant . . . 
from asserting any claims . . . against E&Y, its present or 
former officers, directors, partners and employees, or 
against any current or former officers or directors of CUC, 
HFS or Cendant, either in the form of a cross-claim, 
counterclaim, third-party complaint, or other form." App. at 
16. 
 
Deutch filed a timely appeal. On appeal, he makes the 
following arguments: 
 
       (1) The District Court erred by refusing to consider 
       whether the settlement was fair to Cendant, where the 
       corporation was effectively unrepresented in connection 
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       with the settlement because its board of directors faced 
       personal liability in the class action and therefore 
       operated under a conflict of interest; 
 
       (2) The District Court erred by entering a contribution 
       bar order in favor of the HFS Individual Defendants 
       without first determining whether their payment into 
       the settlement was sufficient to extinguish their 
       liability; 
 
       (3) The District Court failed to analyze the fairness or 
       adequacy of the HFS Defendants' settlement separately 
       in order to ensure that the settlement did not impair 
       the rights of Cendant, which will lose valuable 
       contribution rights; 
 
       (4) The District Court erred by denying Deutch's 
       motion to intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
       24(a) in order to protect Cendant's and its current 
       shareholders' rights to contribution; 
 
       (5) The District Court erred by approving the Notice of 
       Settlement which failed to notify current Cendant 
       shareholders that Cendant's contribution claims were 
       being abrogated under the settlement; 
 
       (6) The District Court allowed Cendant to assume the 
       bulk of the settlement payment, thereby permitting an 
       illegal indemnification of individual defendants for the 
       substantial federal securities law claims pending 
       against them; 
 
       (7) The District Court failed to determine what portion 
       of the settlement was attributable to Section 11 of the 
       1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77k. 
 
II. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We will 
uphold a district court's approval of a class action 
settlement unless there has been an abuse of discretion. 
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See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank 
Prod. Liability Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 782-83 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(hereafter In re GM Trucks). 
 
B. Relevance of Settlement's Fairness, Reasonableness, 
       and Adequacy to Cendant 
 
Deutch's principal objection to the settlement is that the 
District Court evaluated it without considering Cendant's 
interests. Deutch contends that the District Court was 
required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) to consider the settlement's 
fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy with regard to 
Cendant because the majority of its board of directors 
suffered a serious conflict of interest at the time the board 
agreed to settle. He alleges that 13 of Cendant's 14 board 
members at that time faced personal liability in the class 
action, effectively making Cendant an unrepresented party 
in the settlement.6 
 
The District Court rejected Deutch's view of its 
responsibility. It stated that Rule 23 "requires court 
scrutiny of settlements to protect absent class member," 
and that "[t]he standard is whether the settlement is fair, 
reasonable and adequate to the class." In re Cendant Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d at 280. The court noted that in 
In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 
F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998), we stated that "Rule 23(e) imposes 
on the trial judge the duty of protecting absentees, which is 
executed by the court's assuring the settlement represents 
adequate compensation for the release of the class claims." 
Id. at 316 (quotation omitted). It cited other courts of 
appeals' decisions that had taken a similar view. See, e.g., 
In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d 155, 159 (4th Cir. 
1991) ("[F]or Rule 23(e) to be satisfied, the court must 
determine only that sufficient compensation is being paid to 
the class, without necessarily speculating as to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Deutch has not specified the individual defendants to whom he 
referred but it appears, from the subsequent derivative action filed in 
Delaware by his counsel on behalf of a different plaintiff, that they are 
Henry Silverman, Martin Edelman, John Snodgrass, James Buckman, 
Michael Monaco, Stephen Holmes, Brian Mulroney, Robert Nederlander, 
Robert Pittman, Robert Smith, Leonard Coleman, Leonard Schutzman, 
and Robert Schutzman. 
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appropriateness of the contributions of the various settling 
defendants."); In re Warner Comm. Sec. Litig. , 798 F.2d 35, 
37 (2d Cir. 1986) ("If the total compensation to class 
members is fair, reasonable, and adequate, the court is not 
required to supervise how the defendants apportion liability 
for that compensation among themselves."). 
 
The District Court declined to apply the "entire fairness" 
standard advocated by Deutch, which the court believed 
would require it to "substitute its judgment for the 
judgment of Cendant's board to determine whether the 
settlement is in the company's best interest." In re Cendant 
Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d at 280. Instead, it held 
that any claim that the Cendant settlement is unfair to 
Cendant and its current shareholders should be brought as 
a derivative action under Delaware corporate law. See id. 
 
Deutch argues that our decision in Eichenholtz v. 
Brennan, 52 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1995), requires consideration 
of the interests of persons other than class members. 
Eichenholtz involved a securities fraud class action brought 
against International Thoroughbred Breeders ("ITB"), 
individual members of ITB's Board of Directors, and three 
registered brokers. ITB and the individual board members 
negotiated a settlement with the class, which contained a 
provision that would prevent the non-settling defendants 
from commencing any claim for contribution or indemnity 
against the settling defendants. The non-settling defendants 
appealed from the district court's approval of the settlement 
as being fair, reasonable, and adequate to the class and 
ITB. 
 
In our opinion on appeal, we stated that "[w]here the 
rights of third parties are affected, it is not enough to 
evaluate the fairness of the settlement to the settling 
parties; the interests of such third parties must be 
considered." Id. at 482. That is the language on which 
Deutch relies, but he takes it out of context. In response to 
the argument by the settling parties that the non-settling 
defendants had no standing, we held that the non-settling 
defendants did have standing to object because they 
claimed to have "suffered a cognizable prejudice by the 
approval of the partial settlement." Id. at 483. We ultimately 
held that the non-settling defendants would not be 
 
                                14 
  
prejudiced because they would be responsible only for their 
portion of the liability. See id. at 487. Therefore we affirmed 
the district court's approval of the partial settlement. 
 
Cendant does not stand in the position of a non-settling 
defendant or an unrepresented third party whose rights are 
affected by the settlement. Quite the contrary. Cendant is 
a settling defendant. Therefore, Eichenholtz does not control 
our disposition of this case. 
 
Deutch also cites to Judge Newman's concurrence in In 
re Warner Comm. Sec. Litig., 798 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1986). 
In that case, a class member who still owned stock in 
Warner Communications, Inc. sought to overturn the 
district court's approval of a securities fraud class action 
settlement against Warner, one of its subsidiaries, and 
certain of their officers and directors. The class member 
argued, much like Deutch argues now, that the district 
court should have compelled a greater contribution from 
the individual defendants. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's approval of the 
settlement after noting that the district court's fiduciary 
duties covered the class members and not the defendants. 
See id. at 37. 
 
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge Newman agreed 
with the majority that "normally, once a district court is 
satisfied that the total compensation paid to class members 
in settlement of a class action is fair and reasonable, the 
court need not be concerned as to how the defendants 
apportion liability for the settlement among themselves." Id. 
at 38 (Newman, J., concurring). He then noted: 
 
       [I]n a case such as this, where the apportionment 
       between corporate and individual defendants can have 
       economic significance for a shareholder-claimant, some 
       scrutiny of the portion contributed by a corporate 
       defendant normally would be appropriate. In such 
       circumstances, a settlement might well be shown to be 
       unreasonable to a shareholder if the corporate 
       defendant contributed so much more than a fair share 
       as to cause a discernable incremental pro rata decline 
       in the value of the shareholder's stock below the 
       reduction attributable to a fair contribution. 
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Id. Judge Newman's view apparently did not convince his 
colleagues but he ultimately concurred with the judgment 
of the majority because the Delaware Court of Chancery 
had already determined in a derivative action that the 
allocation of the settlement's burdens between the 
corporation and the individual defendants was fair. See id. 
 
To the extent that Judge Newman's view was that the 
fairness of the allocation between the corporation and other 
defendants is an issue to be considered in a derivative 
action, we agree. Deutch's allegations that Cendant was 
unrepresented in the settlement negotiations because a 
majority of its board of directors operated under a conflict 
of interest and that Cendant's board members breached 
their duty of loyalty are best made in a shareholder 
derivative action. See, e.g., Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994, 
996 (2d Cir. 1965) ("A new derivative suit against 
management for fraud or waste in releasing corporate 
claims for inadequate payment can redress improper 
settlements even without setting them aside."); In re Warner 
Comm. Sec. Litig., 618 F. Supp. 735, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
("If [the objector] believes that the settlement is unfair to 
Warner he should pursue his objection in the Delaware 
Chancery Court . . . . This Court is concerned solely with 
the fairness of the settlement to the class."), aff'd, 798 F.2d 
35 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that the Delaware Chancery Court 
had already resolved the issue of apportionment of the 
burdens of the settlement between the corporations and 
their officers). 
 
Significantly, counsel for Cendant informed us at oral 
argument that the same counsel for Deutch in this appeal 
has commenced a derivative action in Delaware Chancery 
Court on behalf of a different Cendant shareholder. That 
action, entitled Resnik v. Silverman et al., Civ. A. No. 18329 
(Del. Ch. filed Sept. 19, 2000), includes the allegation that 
13 of the HFS Individual Defendants breached their duties 
of loyalty and good faith by causing Cendant to obtain 
releases of their personal liability when settling the class 
action. Thus, the derivative action plaintiff will have an 
opportunity to make the same argument that Deutch is 
trying to make here. 
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In so holding, we are not convinced by Deutch's 
contentions that the state law derivative action will be 
inadequate to protect Cendant's rights. Deutch asserts that 
a derivative action is not the functional equivalent of a 
contribution claim, but, as his counsel conceded at oral 
argument, the alleged damages in the derivative action are 
similar to those in a contribution claim. 
 
Deutch also argues that a state law derivative action 
plaintiff will face significant roadblocks to Cendant's 
recovery from the directors for their fair share of liability. 
He first notes that a derivative action plaintiff will have to 
satisfy the demand requirement. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984) (recognizing that the demand 
requirement "exists at the threshold, first to insure that a 
stockholder exhaust his intracorporate remedies, and then 
to provide a safeguard against strike suits"). This is a 
generally applicable requirement for any derivative action 
and does not make the derivative action inadequate. Next, 
Deutch complains that Delaware law allows Cendant's 
officers and directors to seek indemnification. If so, that 
reflects the policy of the state corporation law but does not 
provide a basis for objection by current shareholders to a 
class action settlement. 
 
We believe that the District Court correctly identified the 
applicable law - under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e), courts must 
determine whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and 
adequate to the class. The fiduciary duty to the class exists 
because the very nature of the class action device prevents 
many who have claims from directly participating in the 
litigation process. See In re GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 805 
("Rule 23(e) imposes on the trial judge the duty of 
protecting absentees."); see also 2 Herbert Newberg & Alba 
Conte, Newberg on Class Actions S 11.46, at 11-105 to 11- 
106 (3d ed. 1992) ("The court must be assured that the 
settlement secures an adequate advantage for the class in 
return for the surrender of litigation rights against the 
defendants."). Deutch has not persuaded us that the 
court's fiduciary duty under Rule 23(e) should be extended 
to include defendant corporations even if they may be 
controlled by individuals who have conflicts of interest. 
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Deutch has made several other arguments that require 
little discussion. He argues that the Notice of Settlement 
was deficient because it failed to inform current Cendant 
shareholders that the settlement would eliminate Cendant's 
rights to contribution. However, Deutch fails to show that 
current Cendant shareholders who were not part of the 
class should have been notified of the settlement. Rule 23(e) 
requires only that "notice of the proposed dismissal or 
compromise [of the class action] shall be given to all 
members of the class." Because there is no requirement 
imposed by Rule 23(e) or our case law to inform current 
shareholders of corporate defendants of the settlement or 
the allocation, we reject Deutch's objection to the Notice of 
Settlement. 
 
Deutch also argues that the District Court erred by 
denying his motion to intervene as of right, because he had 
a right to intervene as a derivative action plaintiff to protect 
Cendant's rights to contribution.7 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
24(a), an applicant can intervene as of right "when the 
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and the 
applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action 
may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's 
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's 
interest is adequately represented by existing parties." 
Inasmuch as we have declined to hold that Cendant was 
unrepresented in the settlement negotiations, we see no 
reason why Deutch is entitled to intervene in order to object 
to the settlement on behalf of Cendant. As we noted above, 
the proper forum for Deutch's allegations is a derivative 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In addition, Deutch argued before the District Court that he could 
intervene as of right in order to protect his interest as a current 
Cendant 
shareholder. The District Court rejected this argument, stating that the 
logical result would be that a corporation could not settle any lawsuit 
against it without first obtaining the approval of every shareholder. See 
In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d at 277. Although Deutch 
listed this issue in his statement of issues on appeal, he did not argue 
the point in his brief and therefore we will not consider it. See Travitz 
v. 
Northeast Dep't ILGWU Health & Welfare Fund, 13 F.3d 704, 711 (3d Cir. 
1994) ("When an issue is not pursued in the argument section of the 
brief, the appellant has abandoned and waived that issue on appeal."). 
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action against Cendant's board members for breach of 
fiduciary duties. Therefore, the District Court did not err in 
denying Deutch's motion to intervene as of right in the 
class action and granting him only permissive intervention 
under Rule 24(b). 
 
C. Allocation of the Burdens of Settlement  
 
Deutch's remaining contentions stem primarily from his 
belief that Cendant may have paid more than its fair share 
of the settlement to the benefit of the HFS Individual 
Defendants. He argues first that the District Court should 
not have released the HFS Individual Defendants from 
certain contribution claims that could have been brought 
by Cendant without first determining whether the HFS 
Individual Defendants paid their fair share into the 
settlement. 
 
The District Court's order approving the settlement 
provides that "[a]ll actions and claims for contribution are 
permanently barred, enjoined and finally discharged (i) as 
provided by 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(f)(7)(A), and (ii) as may be 
provided by applicable federal or state statutes or common 
law." App. at 16. The court added that "this Judgment shall 
not be deemed a waiver or release of and shall not preclude 
Cendant . . . from asserting any claims . . . against E&Y, its 
present or former officers, directors, partners and 
employees, or against any current or former officers or 
directors of CUC, HFS or Cendant, either in the form of a 
cross-claim, counterclaim, third-party complaint, or other 
form." App. at 16. 
 
In entering the contribution bar, the District Court 
believed itself bound by the settlement discharge provision 
of the Reform Act which provides: 
 
       A covered person who settles any private action at any 
       time before final verdict or judgment shall be 
       discharged from all claims for contribution brought by 
       other persons. Upon entry of the settlement by the 
       court, the court shall enter a bar order constituting the 
       final discharge of all obligations to the plaintiff of the 
       settling covered person arising out of the action. The 
       order shall bar all future claims for contribution arising 
       out of the action - 
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       (i) by any person against the settling covered person; 
       and 
 
       (ii) by the settling covered person against any person, 
       other than a person whose liability has been 
       extinguished by the settlement of the settling covered 
       person. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(f)(7)(A). 
 
Deutch reads the language of subsection (ii) to mean that 
"only a person who has paid to extinguish his own liability 
- i.e., one whose liability is not extinguished by the 
payment of another - is entitled to a contribution bar." Br. 
of Appellant at 32. In his view, because the HFS Individual 
Defendants have not paid their fair share into the 
settlement, they are not entitled to a contribution bar but 
rather are liable for contribution claims from Cendant. 
 
We acknowledge at the outset that there is some question 
as to the scope of the contribution bar imposed by the 
District Court. The District Court's order does not identify 
by name those parties who are covered by the contribution 
bar. However, in its opinion denying Deutch's motion to 
intervene as of right the court stated, "[a]ll parties concede 
that the HFS Individual Defendants are covered by the 
contribution bar for Section 10(b) claims and outside HFS 
defendant-directors for Section 11 claims as well. Disputed 
is the impact of the bar on the CUC Individual Defendants 
who arguably are not parties to settlement but whose 
liability to the plaintiff class is extinguished by the 
settlement as structured." In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 
109 F. Supp. 2d at 277 n.4. 
 
The issue of the contribution bar is raised by Deutch 
because he argues that the District Court erred in imposing 
a contribution bar in favor of the HFS Individual 
Defendants without first determining if they had paid their 
fair share into the settlement. However, we believe this is 
an inappropriate time to flesh out the various uncertainties 
with respect to the scope of the contribution bar. Because 
no party has yet filed a claim for contribution, the District 
Court was not required to decide the issue raised here by 
Deutch. 
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It is not necessary to determine who is covered by the 
contribution bar in order to address Deutch's argument 
that the District Court should have determined if the HFS 
Individual Defendants paid their fair share into the 
settlement before imposing a contribution bar in their favor. 
Nothing in the text of 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(f)(7)(A) or in the 
legislative history of the Reform Act suggests that there is 
such a requirement, see H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369 
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730; S. Rep. No. 
104-98 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, and we 
decline to impose one in this case. 
 
Deutch argues that such a requirement is supported by 
the Reform Act's policy of favoring proportionate liability 
among wrongdoers. The proportionate liability provisions of 
the Reform Act do not support Deutch's argument, as they 
merely state that "a covered person against whom a final 
judgment is entered in a private action shall be liable solely 
for the portion of the judgment that corresponds to the 
percentage of responsibility of that covered person." 15 
U.S.C. S 78u-4(f)(2)(B)(i).8 Thus, when there is a final 
judgment in an action where other defendants have 
previously settled, i.e., a partial settlement,"the verdict or 
judgment shall be reduced by the greater of - (i) an amount 
that corresponds to the percentage of responsibility of that 
[settling] covered person; or (ii) the amount paid to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Act further provides: 
 
       In any private action, the court shall instruct the jury to answer 
       special interrogatories, or if there is no jury, shall make 
findings, 
       with respect to each covered person and each of the other persons 
       claim by any of the parties to have caused or contributed to the 
loss 
       incurred by the plaintiff, including persons who have entered into 
       settlements with the plaintiff or plaintiffs, concerning- 
 
       (i) whether such person violated the securities laws; 
 
       (ii) the percentage of responsibility of such person, measured as a 
       percentage of the total fault of all persons who caused or 
       contributed to the loss incurred by the plaintiff; and 
 
       (iii) whether such person knowingly committed a violation of the 
       securities laws. 
 
15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(f)(3)(A). 
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plaintiff by that [settling] covered person." 15 U.S.C. S 78u- 
4(f)(7)(B). Such a reduction is appropriate because non- 
settling defendants would otherwise be prejudiced if they 
were held fully liable for the entire amount of the verdict or 
judgment. The situation before us is different because there 
has been a full settlement of claims. 
 
Two of the cases on which Deutch relies, Eichenholtz v. 
Brennan, 52 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 1995), and TBG, Inc. v. 
Bendis, 36 F.3d 916 (10th Cir. 1994), both involved partial 
settlements in which non-settling defendants would have 
been prejudiced if proportionate fault had not been 
determined. However, neither Eichenholtz nor TBG 
discusses the situation where the parties have negotiated a 
full settlement of claims, and where the rationale behind 
proportionate fault reduction in partial settlements 
(avoiding prejudice to non-settling defendants) is 
inapplicable. Indeed, one of the benefits of a full settlement 
is the avoidance of a determination of the merits. See, e.g., 
Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1971) ("In examining 
a proposed compromise for approval or disapproval under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) the court does not try the case. The 
very purpose of compromise is to avoid the delay and 
expense of such a trial.") (quotation omitted). Moreover, 
both Eichenholtz and TBG were decided before the 
applicable date of the Reform Act. 
 
Inapplicable here for the same reasons are United States 
v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174 (3d Cir. 1994), and 
Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 85 (D. 
Conn. 1976), where releases of contribution claims were 
negotiated by the parties. That the Reform Act significantly 
changed the law of securities fraud since Herbst  and the 
other cases on which Deutch relies cannot be gainsaid. We 
therefore find no support for Deutch's position in the cases 
he cites. 
 
The District Court's order approving the settlement takes 
great care in preserving to Cendant any claims "against any 
current or former officers or directors of CUC, HFS or 
Cendant, either in the form of a cross-claim, counterclaim, 
third party complaint, or other form." App. at 16. Thus, the 
settlement itself should not prejudice a derivative action 
plaintiff, and the District Court did not err in rejecting 
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Deutch's claim that the court should not impose a 
contribution bar in favor of the HFS Individual Defendants 
without first determining if they have paid their fair share 
into the settlement. 
 
Deutch relies on language in our decision in Girsh v. 
Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975)9  to support his 
contention that the District Court was required to analyze 
the value of the contribution of the HFS Individual 
Defendants. The language to which Deutch refers 10 was 
directed to our concern that the district court had approved 
a class action settlement without providing an adequate 
record that would enable us to fulfill our review function. 
 
Unlike the situation in Girsh, there was no deficiency in 
the record in this case. The District Court considered the 
nine Girsh factors before finding the Cendant settlement to 
be fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court recognized 
that questions had been raised about the value of the HFS 
Individual Defendants' contribution and noted that"the 
HFS Defendants have agreed to contribute to the class 50% 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In Girsh, we set forth nine factors that should be considered in 
connection with a class action settlement's fairness, reasonableness, and 
adequacy. The nine Girsh factors are: (1) the complexity, expense, and 
likely duration of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to the 
settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery 
completed; (4) the risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of 
establishing damages; (6) the risks of maintaining the class action 
through the trial; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a 
greater 
judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light 
of the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of reasonableness of the 
settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks 
of litigation. See id. at 156-57. 
10. We noted: 
 
       The district court did not specifically deal with the Gluck 
settlement 
       and we are, therefore, at a loss and without the benefit of its 
       analysis as to why $10,000.00 was a fair and adequate settlement 
       of all claims against defendant Gluck. It may be that the 
$10,000.00 
       contribution is overly generous. On the other hand, it may be 
       grossly inadequate. The determination as to the fairness of this 
       aspect of the settlement must depend upon facts still to be 
       developed. 
 
Id. at 159 (emphasis in original). 
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of any recovery against E & Y." In re Cendant Corp. Sec. 
Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d at 284. In its opinion rejecting the 
objections of the class members, the District Court stated: 
"The Court recognizes that this recovery is inchoate but 
once again affirms that it is not `illusory.' This does not 
mean that valuation is impossible, but only difficult." In re 
Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 109 F. Supp. 2d at 256. As 
Deutch notes, the court stated that it need not consider the 
"added value from recovery against E & Y" before it held 
that the Cendant settlement was fair, reasonable, and 
adequate. Id. This did not amount to an abuse of the 
court's discretion. 
 
Deutch further argues that the HFS Individual 
Defendants' promise to give 50% of their recovery against 
E&Y to the class was illusory. He states that "the 
settlement creates no obligation for the HFS Defendants to 
prosecute the suit after the settlement is final or to 
guarantee some minimum amount commensurate with 
their liability - even though the other parties have fully 
complied with their obligations." Br. of Appellant at 44. 
 
However, implicit in the settlement is a promise to make 
a good faith effort to seek recovery against E&Y. See Russell 
v. Princeton Labs., Inc., 50 N.J. 30, 38, 231 A.2d 800, 805 
(1967) ("A contract should not be read to vest a party . . . 
with the power virtually to make his promise illusory."); 
Nolan v. Control Data Corp., 243 N.J. Super. 420, 431, 579 
A.2d 1252, 1258 App. Div. (1990) (implying a good faith 
requirement because a "[l]iteral interpretation of these 
clauses would go far towards making these contracts 
illusory, a result which courts usually seek to avoid"); 2 
Joseph M. Perillo & Helen Hadjiyannakis Bender, Corbin on 
Contracts S 5.28, at 149-50 (rev. ed. 1995) ("An implied 
obligation to use good faith is enough to avoid the finding 
of an illusory promise.").11 
 
Deutch also argues that the District Court was required, 
but failed, to determine the amount paid into the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We note that Cendant and the HFS Individual Defendants 
subsequently did file cross-claims against E&Y and were for the most 
part successful in overcoming E&Y's motion to dismiss. See In re 
Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d 585 (D.N.J. 2001). 
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settlement to release the claims brought under Section 11 
of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. S 77k(f). He contends 
that this determination was necessary because the 
contribution bar mandated by 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(f) cannot 
bar "contribution claims for S 11 violations against inside 
directors . . . under any circumstance." Reply Br. of 
Appellant at 16.12 
 
Once again, we conclude that whether, and to what 
extent, the HFS Individual Defendants are covered under 
the contribution bar is better presented in a contribution 
claim, if any, brought by Cendant, E&Y, or the CUC 
Individual Defendants against those defendants. We need 
only hold that the District Court was not required under 
the Reform Act or Rule 23(e) to apportion the settlement 
according to the plethora of claims raised in the class 
action. See, e.g., Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1330 (5th 
Cir. 1977) ("It cannot be overemphasized that neither the 
trial court in approving the settlement nor this Court in 
reviewing that approval have the right or the duty to reach 
any ultimate conclusions on the issues of the fact and law 
which underlie the merits of the dispute.") (quotation 
omitted). 
 
Finally, Deutch argues that because Cendant is paying 
the entire cash amount of the settlement, it constitutes an 
impermissible indemnification of the HFS Individual 
Defendants for securities law violations. Deutch again cites 
to Eichenholtz, 52 F.3d at 483, where we held that there 
was no express or implied right to indemnification under 
the federal securities laws and recognized that"federal 
courts disallow claims for indemnification because such 
claims run counter to the policies underlying the federal 
securities acts." Id. at 484. 
 
Ordinarily, indemnification refers to the reimbursement 
by a corporation to its directors and officers for liabilities 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Deutch apparently refers to 15 U.S.C. S 78u-4(f)(10), which defines 
"covered person" as "(i) a defendant in any private action arising under 
this chapter [i.e., Section 10(b) claims]; or (ii) a defendant in any 
private 
action arising under section 77k of this title [i.e., Section 11 claims], 
who 
is an outside director of the issuer of the securities that are the 
subject 
of the action." 
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incurred in connection with actions brought against them 
in their official capacities. See, e.g., Kirschbaum v. WRGSB 
Associates, 243 F.3d 145, 156 (3d Cir. 2001). Cendant has 
not reimbursed the HFS Individual Defendants, all of whom 
were directors and/or officers of Cendant at some point 
during the class period. Instead, the settlement provides for 
Cendant to make a direct payment to the class of $2.85 
billion. Deutch has not cited to any case in which a court 
has determined that a full settlement of claims amounted to 
an indemnification of certain defendants. Therefore, we 
decline to hold that the settlement between Cendant, the 
HFS Individual Defendants, and the Lead Plaintiff 
amounted to an indemnification of the HFS Individual 
Defendants. 
 
III. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Deutch has not convinced us that his objections to the 
settlement are supported by the applicable law, nor has he 
persuaded us that new rules are required for a derivative 
action plaintiff. Whether Cendant's board members 
breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation is best 
addressed in a derivative action, and not in connection with 
approval of a class action settlement. The District Court 
was not required by Rule 23 or the Reform Act to consider 
the effect of the settlement on Cendant nor was it required 
to determine the relative fault of the defendants before 
approving the settlement. Therefore, we hold that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting 
Deutch's objections to the settlement. 
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